The expertise and personalized approach exceeded all our expectations. Read all reviews
Posted by 19 May 2025 in Legal alert
Posted by:
Maryna Mysenko, Associate
Taras Horbatiuk, Managing Partner
Yurii Bielokon, Senior Partner
Natalia Ivanova, Paralegal
For decades, Ukraine has enforced a strict single citizenship principle, effectively prohibiting dual nationality. Many prospective immigrants wonder: does Ukraine allow dual citizenship? Until now, the answer was largely “no,” as new Ukrainian citizens have been expected to renounce any prior allegiance. However, this is poised to change. In late 2024 the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) passed at first reading a landmark draft law to permit dual or multiple citizenship under certain conditions. Top officials confirm that the final Ukraine dual citizenship law should be ready by the end of 2025. This reform, initiated by President Volodymyr Zelensky, is a game-changer for foreign nationals interested in immigrating to Ukraine and for millions of Ukrainians in the diaspora. It aims to modernize an outdated system and align Ukraine with global norms, all while safeguarding national security in wartime. The following sections break down the draft law’s content, address concerns raised in the media, and compare Ukraine’s approach to dual citizenship with policies in countries like Germany, Poland, and Israel.
Under the current law “On Citizenship of Ukraine,” those who acquire another nationality are not legally recognized as anything but Ukrainian by the state (reflecting the Constitution’s notion of “single citizenship”). In practice, many Ukrainians quietly hold second passports, but this has existed in a gray zone. The new draft law explicitly acknowledges “multiple citizenship” as the simultaneous belonging to two or more states.
The law lays out clear cases when dual or multiple citizenship will be allowed:
At Birth: Dual Citizenship from the Start
Birth: A child who obtains Ukrainian citizenship at birth and simultaneously another country’s citizenship (e.g. by parentage or birthplace) can legally hold both. This spares families from having to choose one nationality for their newborn.
Adoption: Safeguarding Ukrainian Roots
If a Ukrainian child is adopted by foreign parents, the child may acquire the adoptive parents’ citizenship without losing Ukrainian citizenship.
Marriage-Based Automatic Citizenship
If a Ukrainian citizen automatically gains another citizenship through marriage to a foreigner (as per that country’s laws), Ukraine will accept this dual status. Crucially, this applies only to automatic conferral; if a formal application is required, it might be treated differently (more on “voluntary” acquisition below).
Automatic Foreign Citizenship by Law
When an adult Ukrainian is deemed to have acquired a foreign nationality by operation of law (without a conscious application), and they have no official certificate of that citizenship, Ukraine will permit this additional nationality. This scenario could cover, for example, ethnic or diasporic citizenships granted broadly by another state.
A simplified naturalization procedure is introduced for foreigners from certain countries that will be designated by the Cabinet of Ministers. Eligible foreigners can become Ukrainian without having to renounce their original citizenship. They will file a declaration recognizing themselves as a Ukrainian citizen in dealings with Ukraine, meaning they accept that within Ukraine they are treated solely as Ukrainian. But unlike before, they won’t need to give up their first passport.
This list of countries is expected to include most EU member states, the UK, Canada, the U.S., Australia, Japan, Israel and others friendly to Ukraine or with large Ukrainian diasporas. In fact, officials hint at 30–40 countries likely on the list, focusing on Western allies and nations hosting many Ukrainian emigrants. Notably Russia and its supporters will not be on this list.
Correspondingly, Ukrainians will be allowed to acquire citizenship of those same friendly countries without forfeiting Ukrainian citizenship. In other words, if a Ukrainian citizen chooses to naturalize in (or otherwise obtain citizenship of) a country from the approved list, they can retain multiple citizenship legally.
This is especially aimed at the millions of Ukrainian war refugees and expats building new lives abroad: they would no longer face the painful choice of giving up Ukrainian citizenship to settle elsewhere. As President Zelensky noted, enabling people to hold several passports “will help solve the problems of those Ukrainians who went abroad and are building a new life there” by keeping their connection to Ukraine.
At the same time, the draft law draws red lines for national security. It explicitly prohibits multiple citizenship involving the Russian Federation or any state that denies Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Practically, this means:
A foreign national holding Russian citizenship (or that of a Russian ally state) will not be allowed to naturalize as a Ukrainian via the new dual-citizenship route. They would presumably still be subject to the old rules (requiring renunciation) if permitted at all.
A Ukrainian citizen who voluntarily acquires Russian citizenship (for example, by applying for a Russian passport) would be considered to have “voluntarily acquired citizenship of an aggressor state”, triggering loss of their Ukrainian citizenship.
The same applies if a Ukrainian adult acquires any other foreign citizenship not on the approved list by their own initiative. This is a new ground for citizenship termination aimed at deterring loyalty to enemy nations. We discuss below the nuances of what counts as “voluntary” and the concerns for Ukrainians in occupied territories.
Importantly, cases of dual citizenship that arise under the allowed scenarios above are explicitly not treated as a violation or as “voluntary” renunciation of allegiance. In other words, if you qualify under one of the lawful multiple citizenship categories (birth, adoption, marriage, etc., or friendly-country citizenships), Ukraine will not penalize or strip your citizenship for having more than one passport.
The law even reinforces an existing principle: in all legal matters inside Ukraine, a dual citizen is regarded only as a Ukrainian citizen. This mirrors the practice in countries like Poland, where a person with Polish and another citizenship is entitled to full Polish rights and cannot use their other nationality as an exemption from duties. Ukraine’s draft upholds equality of all citizens regardless of how citizenship was acquired – addressing diaspora fears that new dual nationals could be treated as second-class.
One of the most significant innovations for prospective immigrants is the simplified naturalization process for citizens of select “friendly” countries. Under current rules, a foreigner must navigate strict criteria and crucially must renounce their prior citizenship (or at least pledge to do so) to obtain a Ukrainian passport. This renunciation requirement has long deterred many qualified candidates. The draft law eliminates that obstacle for certain nationalities. If you are from an approved country, you will be able to apply for Ukrainian citizenship by submitting a special declaration affirming your new status – while keeping your original passport. No “exit visa” from your old citizenship is required.
Equally notable is the relaxation of language and civics requirements in these cases. Normally, applicants must pass Ukrainian language and history exams or show proficiency. Under the new law’s proposal, those using the simplified route will not have to immediately prove knowledge of the Ukrainian language, constitution, or history. Instead, they simply sign an obligation to learn the language and commit to studying the basics of law and history within three years after obtaining citizenship.
This concession lowers the bar for integration initially, making Ukraine more accessible to global talent and members of the Ukrainian diaspora who may not yet be fluent in Ukrainian. (By comparison, many Western countries also waive certain requirements for special categories of immigrants; Ukraine appears to be following suit for those it deems beneficial to welcome.)
Who exactly might qualify for this eased path to Ukrainian nationality? Although the precise list of countries is pending (the Cabinet will draw it up and Parliament must approve it), officials have given strong hints. Likely included are:
Ukraine is aligning its citizenship laws with Western practices, aiming to allow dual nationality with friendly nations. EU countries and other allies are expected to be on the list of states whose citizens can obtain Ukrainian citizenship without renouncing their original nationality.
Conversely, Russia and its client states will be categorically excluded. In fact, not only are Russians barred from the simplified dual citizenship process, but as noted, any Ukrainian who actively takes Russian citizenship can be stripped of Ukrainian citizenship for disloyalty. The ban list goes beyond Russia: it includes countries that voted with Russia against U.N. resolutions upholding Ukraine’s sovereignty (e.g. Belarus, Syria, North Korea, and others). Ukraine is drawing a clear line that dual citizenship is a privilege to be shared with partners, not aggressors.
The draft also extends simplified citizenship (with dual allowance) to special groups who have served Ukraine’s interests, regardless of nationality. For example, foreign volunteers and soldiers fighting in the Ukrainian Armed Forces or National Guard will benefit – a simplified process for them was already introduced in 2021, but it previously required renouncing their first citizenship.
Under the new law, these defenders (and their spouses and children) can obtain Ukrainian passports more easily and keep their original citizenship as well. This change recognizes their contributions and makes Ukraine a more welcoming second home for those who risked their lives for its security.
The proposal to embrace dual citizenship in Ukraine has triggered intense debate. Critics ranging from human rights advocates to opposition politicians have raised potential pitfalls.
Below, we examine these concerns and how the draft law or its proponents address them:
“Online Nation” and Voter Dilution: One worry, voiced by opposition figures like Yulia Tymoshenko and Iryna Gerashchenko, is that Ukraine could inadvertently create an “online people” – new citizens with tenuous ties to the country who obtain citizenship remotely and influence Ukrainian democracy without ever setting foot in Ukraine.
They argue that by allowing foreigners to simply “submit an online declaration” and gain a passport, Ukraine might end up granting voting rights, land ownership rights, and social benefits to individuals with no real connection or loyalty to the state. Such critics label it a threat to national security, suggesting it could swell the electorate with uninformed voters and even serve as a loophole for foreign interests to buy Ukrainian land (since only citizens can own agricultural land under current law).
Response: These fears assume a worst-case scenario that the government insists will not materialize. Firstly, the pool of eligible foreigners is limited to vetted friendly nations – hardly adversaries looking to subvert Ukraine. The simplified procedure is primarily aimed at Ukrainian diaspora members and highly qualified or allied individuals who do have genuine links or commitments to Ukraine (heritage, family, service, etc.), even if they live abroad. It’s not a mass open invitation to any random person on the internet. In practice, applicants will still go through identity and security checks. The “online declaration” is a legal formality – likely they will apply via Ukrainian consulates or a controlled government portal, not literally at the click of a button with no scrutiny. Moreover, Ukraine can calibrate this policy: if needed, residency requirements or minimum ties could be introduced in implementation to ensure new citizens “know Ukraine.” As for land and voting rights, the draft law upholds equal treatment of all citizens, which the worldwide Ukrainian community strongly supports. This means dual citizens would indeed have the same rights. The government, however, views this inclusivity as a feature, not a bug – it wants to enfranchise Ukrainians abroad and friendly foreigners, harnessing their contributions.
Rather than diluting the polity, this could expand Ukraine’s human capital. Countries like Poland illustrate that equal rights for dual citizens need not harm the state: a Polish dual national cannot evade duties or laws using their second citizenship, ensuring loyalty. Ukraine’s law is similar: regardless of other citizenships, a dual citizen in Ukraine is legally treated purely as Ukrainian. Any concern that foreign new citizens will swoop in to buy up land might also be mitigated by existing regulations (Ukraine has a moratorium on land sales to foreigners until a referendum, and if the person is a Ukrainian citizen – even dual – they are no longer a “foreigner” under the law). In short, while vigilance is warranted, the “online nation” specter is likely overblown and can be managed with sensible implementation.
Constitutionality: Some legal experts argue that allowing multiple citizenship may contradict Ukraine’s Constitution, which states “in Ukraine, there is single citizenship” (Article 4). They interpret this as prohibiting dual citizenship altogether. Notably, former official Ihor Koliushko contends that without amending the Constitution, any attempt to permit dual citizenship by mere legislation is unconstitutional.
Since changing the Constitution is impossible during wartime, critics say pushing this law now is risky. They also warn that explicitly barring certain nationalities (e.g. Russians) in the law could be challenged as discriminatory in international courts. For instance, if a Russian citizen married to a Ukrainian is denied the right to dual citizenship, they might appeal to the European Court of Human Rights, claiming unequal treatment.
Response: The authors of the draft law disagree with the hard-line reading of the Constitution. They point to the same Article 4, which after “single citizenship” adds that the grounds for acquiring and terminating citizenship are determined by law. This, they argue, gives Parliament leeway to define those grounds – including allowing multiple citizenship – without a constitutional amendment. Indeed, Ukraine’s current law already skirts the issue by ignoring second citizenships rather than explicitly forbidding them.
The reform simply brings this de facto situation into the legal light and regulates it. As for the Constitutional Court, a group of deputies actually sought an interpretation of “single citizenship” back in 2021, but the court has not issued any decision. In the meantime, many countries’ constitutions call for “single citizenship” in the same sense (meaning one citizenship at the national level, not regional citizenships), yet those countries still allow dual nationality through laws. European practice and the European Convention on Nationality (which Ukraine ratified in 2006) confirm that it’s up to each state to decide whether to accept dual citizenship. Ukraine is choosing to do so in line with its national interest. Regarding the discrimination concern: while excluding aggressor-state nationals is indeed a tough measure, Ukraine can argue it is justified on national security grounds during an ongoing conflict.
There’s precedent for this – for example, Israel prohibits its citizens from holding certain enemy citizenships and can even revoke Israeli citizenship if one voluntarily acquires, say, Iranian or Syrian nationality. Many democratic countries impose special restrictions related to enemy states without running afoul of human rights law, especially when public safety is at stake. Thus, Ukraine’s stance, though bold, is defensible given the extraordinary aggression it faces. In any case, the draft will be submitted to the Constitutional Court for review before final adoption, ensuring an extra check for legality. Lawmakers appear confident that the reform will pass muster, and are prepared to fine-tune language (for instance, precisely defining “voluntary” acquisition) to withstand legal challenges.
Occupied Territories and “Voluntary” Russian Passports: Perhaps the most sensitive issue is how the law affects Ukrainians living under Russian occupation (e.g. Crimea or parts of Donbas) who were forced or pressured into taking Russian passports. Human rights groups like ZMINA and the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union warn that the draft’s provision to strip citizenship for voluntarily acquiring the aggressor’s nationality does not fully account for coercion.
In occupied regions, Russia has engaged in heavy “passportization” – making Russian passports near-mandatory to survive. Residents often had no real choice: without a Russian passport, one could be denied jobs, medical care, pensions, or face intimidation. Occupation authorities stage the process to appear voluntary (requiring written applications and oaths), but in reality it’s under duress. The concern is that Kyiv’s new law might technically consider these people to have “voluntarily obtained Russian citizenship,” thus rendering them subject to losing their Ukrainian citizenship – essentially punishing victims of the occupation. Advocacy director Alyona Lunyova of ZMINA emphasizes that living under occupation itself is coercion, and any passports taken in that context should not be deemed an act of free will.
Response: Drafters of the law have recognized this problem and included important exceptions. The text defines “voluntary acquisition” of a foreign citizenship in a way that excludes cases of coercion. Notably, it references the law on occupied territories which states that any Russian passport obtained under occupation is not recognized by Ukraine if acquired “in a forced manner”.
The draft law explicitly says that the rule about losing Ukrainian citizenship does not apply to circumstances outlined in Part 6 of that occupied territories law (which covers forced citizenship). In simpler terms, if a Ukrainian in Crimea was compelled to take a Russian passport to survive, Ukraine will not count that as a voluntary act that triggers loss of citizenship. Additionally, an amendment was included to protect those who were illegally deported by Russia: if they were essentially kidnapped from Ukraine and given Russian citizenship, that too is not considered “voluntary”.
These nuances are crucial. Human rights monitors like the Helsinki Union have flagged that as many as 1.7 million residents of Crimea took Russian passports in the early years after annexation (nearly the entire adult population), and a significant portion did so out of necessity, not loyalty. The law’s final version will need to ensure it clearly protects these Ukrainians. It may require close coordination with NGOs to identify affected individuals and perhaps a mechanism for them to appeal any citizenship termination by proving duress.
The government’s intention is not to abandon its citizens under occupation but to prevent true collaborators from exploiting dual citizenship. Indeed, Ukraine does not recognize the legitimacy of those Russian passports at all in its eyes – so it would be inconsistent to then punish someone for holding one. We can expect further clarifying language in the law or its by-laws so that only genuinely voluntary adoption of enemy citizenship (for example, a Ukrainian politician or oligarch who chooses to take a Russian passport) will result in loss of Ukrainian citizenship, whereas captive populations are safeguarded.
A somewhat paradoxical debate has emerged: the Ukrainian government argues that allowing dual citizenship will encourage emigrants and war refugees to retain ties and eventually return home. The logic is that if those who fled Ukraine can become citizens of their new countries (for job opportunities, stability, etc.) without losing Ukrainian citizenship, they are more likely to maintain a meaningful connection to Ukraine – perhaps investing, voting, or one day moving back. The World Congress of Ukrainians, representing 20+ million Ukrainian diaspora, strongly supports this view.
They believe dual citizenship will prevent assimilation and “slow down the assimilation of Ukrainians who left”, keeping Ukraine in their hearts and plans. On the other hand, opponents like Mr. Koliushko predict the opposite: once someone secures a comfortable life and citizenship abroad, the need to return to Ukraine diminishes. They fear dual citizenship could permanently drain human capital, as people feel they can hold on to a Ukrainian passport as a sentimental token while fully settling elsewhere.
Response: Both perspectives have merit, but much depends on personal circumstances and Ukraine’s future. It’s true that if someone gains, say, German citizenship while keeping Ukrainian, they have fewer administrative barriers to remaining in Germany indefinitely – possibly reducing urgency to come back. However, dual citizenship also means they don’t have to sever their legal link to Ukraine. That could make a return easier if and when conditions improve (no need to re-apply for citizenship or visas). It also lets them participate in Ukrainian civic life from abroad (through voting, advocacy, etc.), which could strengthen the diaspora’s role in rebuilding Ukraine.
The government’s strategy appears to be long-term: by acknowledging Ukrainians abroad as still Ukrainians, it nurtures a global network that can aid the country economically and politically regardless of physical location. Indeed, Vice Prime Minister Olexiy Chernyshov, in charge of national unity, emphasizes uniting Ukrainians “both in the Motherland and abroad” as a key mission. His ministry is creating online platforms and “Unity Hubs” to support Ukrainians overseas. These efforts go hand-in-hand with the dual citizenship reform. Rather than a simple go-or-return binary, Ukraine is embracing a more fluid concept of nationality – a global Ukrainian nation.
The risk of permanent emigration is real, but that trend is happening even without dual citizenship (many have settled abroad since the war began). Allowing dual nationality might actually soften the blow of emigration, by keeping doors open. Ultimately, whether people come back will depend on rebuilding Ukraine into an attractive place to live. Dual citizenship is a tool that can help in that endeavor by not forcing people to choose once and for all. And it’s telling that diaspora organizations support the measure: they see it as a lifeline to maintain identity, whereas forbidding dual citizenship in the past did not stop emigration – it only alienated those who left.
Ukraine’s move toward accepting dual citizenship reflects a broader international trend. Many countries have relaxed their stance on multiple nationality in recent decades, recognizing that globalization and migration have made rigid single-citizenship policies impractical. Here is how Ukraine’s prospective policy stacks up against a few selected countries:
As a neighboring country with a similar historical aversion to dual allegiance, Poland’s law is instructive. Poland does allow dual citizenship, with the key rule that a dual national is treated solely as a Polish citizen by Polish authorities. There’s no penalty for possessing another passport. In fact, Polish law explicitly states that holding Polish and another citizenship is permitted, and such individuals have the same rights and obligations as any other Pole.
Importantly, Poland does not require renunciation of the prior citizenship when naturalizing. The only way to lose Polish citizenship is to formally request to renounce it – the state cannot involuntarily strip someone’s citizenship. Ukraine’s draft law is moving in this Polish direction: it will no longer force new citizens to drop their original nationality, except in cases involving enemy states. Like Poland, Ukraine will also maintain the doctrine that domestically a person can’t use their second passport to avoid duties – which helps safeguard national interests. The big difference is that Poland hasn’t been at war; Ukraine’s added caveats (banning aggressor citizenships) arise from its security situation, whereas Poland doesn’t single out any particular foreign citizenship for prohibition.
For many years Germany was famously strict – most immigrants had to renounce their old citizenship to become German (with exceptions mainly for EU citizens). However, Germany has recently undergone a “dual citizenship revolution.” In 2023–2024, the German government reformed the law to allow multiple citizenships for both new and existing German citizens. As of June 2024, Germans can acquire another nationality without losing their German passport.
Likewise, foreigners can naturalize as Germans without giving up their original citizenship, and the residency period for naturalization was shortened (8 years to 5 in many cases). These changes in Europe’s largest country underscore a recognition that dual identity can be compatible with loyalty. Ukraine’s new law is in step with this modern European norm. It similarly streamlines naturalization for those it wants to attract and accepts that people may keep emotional and legal ties to more than one nation. Both Ukraine and Germany include a concept of jus soli (birthright citizenship) tolerance: Germany’s reform ended the practice of making children born with dual nationality choose one at adulthood, and Ukraine’s bill explicitly allows children with multiple citizenship from birth to keep them. One divergence: Germany doesn’t have a specific enemy-state exclusion like Ukraine does – a reflection that Ukraine’s context (active defense against Russian aggression) is unique.
Israel’s citizenship policy offers a fascinating parallel, especially given Israel’s focus on its diaspora and security. Israel permits dual citizenship in many cases. In particular, Jewish immigrants under the Law of Return can become Israeli while retaining their previous citizenship. This was a deliberate choice to encourage the global Jewish diaspora to “come home” without forcing them to forfeit their birth nationality. Ukraine’s outreach to its own diaspora (and war refugees) through dual citizenship is quite analogous – President Zelensky has spoken of a “global Ukrainian nation” in a similar spirit.
However, Israel also has stricter rules for those who seek to naturalize through other means (e.g. non-Jewish immigrants): typically, naturalization (not via the Law of Return) requires renouncing the prior citizenship. Ukraine’s law would be more liberal in this respect for friendly foreigners, not requiring renunciation. On national security, Israel doesn’t forbid dual citizenship in general, but it has provisions to revoke citizenship for acts of disloyalty, including obtaining citizenship of enemy states like Iran or Lebanon.
Ukraine’s approach to strip citizenship from those who take up Russian nationality is very much in line with this Israeli practice. Both countries effectively say: we welcome dual loyalty with our friends (for Israel, Jews abroad; for Ukraine, its diaspora and allies), but we will not tolerate dual allegiance with an adversary state. The balance Israel strikes has generally been accepted internationally, suggesting that Ukraine’s similar measures can be justified.
Many other countries now accept dual citizenship: for example, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and the United States all allow it with virtually no restrictions. Ukraine is moving from one of the last holdouts against dual nationality toward joining the majority. This can boost Ukraine’s attractiveness to foreign investors, entrepreneurs, and experts.
A foreign national considering immigration to Ukraine will soon not have to ask “does Ukraine accept dual citizenship?” with trepidation – the answer will be an encouraging yes (as long as their country is on friendly terms with Ukraine). They can become Ukrainian and still keep the legal connection to their home country, which is often critical for business or family reasons. From an economic standpoint, this reform could help Ukraine compete in the global talent market, especially in the post-war rebuilding phase when every skilled individual counts.
By supporting this legislation, Ukraine is positioning itself as a more open and globally integrated country. Here are some of the key benefits of the dual citizenship reform, for both Ukraine and those who choose to connect their lives with it:
Ukraine has one of the largest diasporas in the world – an estimated 20 million people of Ukrainian origin live outside the country. In the past, if these expatriates or their descendants wanted to obtain Ukrainian citizenship (or retain it), they faced legal hurdles. Many had to hide second passports or forego Ukrainian nationality altogether.
Allowing multiple citizenship will enable diaspora Ukrainians – whether third-generation in Canada or recent war refugees in Poland – to claim their Ukrainian citizenship proudly and legally without giving up their current citizenship. This symbolic and practical link can translate into greater diaspora involvement in Ukrainian affairs, investments, tourism, and cultural exchange. It’s a two-way street: Ukraine acknowledges them as full members of the polity, and they in turn can contribute more confidently, including through voting and even public service.
The World Congress of Ukrainians hailed the first reading of the law and underscored that dual citizens must have equal rights and responsibilities. This suggests diaspora communities are eager to engage on an equal footing, which can only benefit Ukraine’s democracy and economy (through remittances and projects). In sum, the reform says “You never stop being Ukrainian just because you live elsewhere.” This ideological shift could energize Ukrainians worldwide.
Since the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, nearly 5 million Ukrainians have been forced to leave and temporarily settle abroad. These people often need to obtain some legal status in host countries – some may even seek local citizenship if the war and rebuilding take many years. Under old rules, a Ukrainian who naturalized in, say, Germany or Canada would technically lose Ukrainian citizenship (even if unenforced in practice).
The new law ensures they can build a stable life abroad (by obtaining local citizenship for security, social benefits, jobs) without severing ties to Ukraine. Psychologically and legally, this is a huge relief. They can hold onto their Ukrainian passport, maintain property or voting rights at home, and feel they have a stake in Ukraine’s future – increasing the likelihood they might return when possible. Even if some don’t return, having dual status means they can freely travel back to reconnect and eventually help in reconstruction. The reform thus treats refugees not as “lost citizens” but as an integral part of Ukraine’s extended nation, respecting their need to adapt abroad while keeping the door open for homecoming.
For foreign nationals considering Ukraine as a place to work, invest, or settle, the prospect of dual citizenship Ukraine is very appealing. Many professionals hesitate to relocate to a country if it means forfeiting their original citizenship (which could be a safety net or of emotional value). By accepting dual citizenship, Ukraine becomes a more competitive destination. For example, a tech entrepreneur from the EU or Israel could take up Ukrainian citizenship to do business in Ukraine’s growing IT sector, without giving up the benefits of their original citizenship (such as visa-free travel or business networks elsewhere).
This flexibility can encourage high-value individuals to commit to Ukraine’s economy. It also benefits Ukraine’s military and defense by cementing the loyalty of foreign fighters who joined its ranks – they can be rewarded with citizenship that doesn’t demand them to renounce their native country, a gesture of gratitude that also bolsters Ukraine’s forces with experienced, devoted soldiers. Overall, embracing multiple citizenship sends a message that Ukraine is open to the world and ready to integrate into global systems, which aligns with its aspirations for EU membership and beyond.
By removing the punitive approach to dual citizenship, Ukraine is aligning with the democratic principle that citizenship is a fundamental right of a person, not something to be lightly stripped away. The new law enshrines the idea that Ukrainians cannot be involuntarily deprived of their citizenship (except in narrowly defined hostile allegiance cases) and that statelessness should be avoided.
This is in keeping with European human rights standards. It also acknowledges the reality of personal identity in a modern world – people can genuinely belong to two nations at once. Ukraine’s insistence that dual citizens fulfill the same duties (pay taxes, serve if drafted, etc.) ensures that this is a responsible freedom. For foreigners, it demonstrates Ukraine’s confidence that one can be a loyal Ukrainian and still honor one’s roots elsewhere, just as immigrants to the United States or Canada proudly hold dual nationality. Such confidence in its citizens’ loyalty is the mark of a mature, pluralistic society.
Of course, implementing dual citizenship will not be without challenges. Ukraine will need to update administrative systems to track and manage citizens who have multiple passports (perhaps requiring disclosure of other nationalities to authorities for transparency). It will have to train officials to handle new types of citizenship applications and develop cooperation with other states on issues like military service obligations for dual citizens.
Public opinion inside Ukraine will also need to be considered – some Ukrainians have long viewed dual citizenship with suspicion (often due to the abuse of Russian passports in the east and Crimea). Ongoing communication about the purpose of the law – to strengthen Ukraine, not weaken it – will be key. The timing of full adoption may also depend on wartime exigencies and the Constitutional Court’s review. But the momentum is clearly there: Vice PM Chernyshov has stated “the law will be ready by the end of the year”, and work is underway to finalize it despite the war.
In supporting the proposed multiple citizenship Ukraine legislation, policymakers are embracing a forward-looking vision of Ukrainian identity. This reform recognizes that Ukraine’s strength partly lies in its people – not only those at home, but also those abroad and those who wish to join its national journey. If enacted, the law will formally answer the query “does Ukraine allow dual citizenship?” with a resounding yes (under defined conditions), overturning a long-held prohibition. Ukraine would join the ranks of nations that leverage dual citizenship as a tool for development, unity, and diaspora engagement.
By loosening citizenship restrictions, Ukraine is broadening its tent: it invites its far-flung sons and daughters back under the flag, and it welcomes foreign friends to stand in solidarity as fellow citizens. The move also signals confidence that Ukrainian citizenship is something people desire – a citizenship worthy of being one of two (or more) that a person holds. Given the fierce war being fought to defend the very idea of Ukrainian statehood, enabling more people to share in that statehood is a powerful statement.
To be sure, concerns about security and loyalty must be continually addressed. The final law should have clear safeguards to prevent misuse, and the government must remain vigilant that dual citizenship is not exploited by malign actors. But the answer to these challenges is not to retreat into isolation. Rather, Ukraine is showing that it can adapt its laws to empower its citizens while protecting national interests. The experiences of Germany, Poland, Israel, and others provide valuable lessons that Ukraine is heeding in crafting its own model.
For foreign nationals considering making Ukraine their new home – be they investors, professionals, volunteers, or diasporans – this reform is an encouraging development. It means they can integrate into Ukrainian society and even obtain the coveted Ukrainian passport without losing their original nationality. They can truly have the best of both worlds, contributing to Ukraine’s future while maintaining ties elsewhere.
As Ukraine prepares to finalize the dual citizenship law, optimism is high that it will strengthen the country’s resilience. Oleksiy Chernyshov encapsulated the philosophy behind the change: uniting all Ukrainians worldwide as part of one nation. In the 21st century, citizenship need not be a zero-sum game. Ukraine’s message is that loyalty and love for a country are not diminished by also loving another – in fact, they can be complementary. For a Ukraine that aspires to join the European Union and uphold democratic values, this inclusive approach to citizenship is a timely and positive step.
Posted by:
Maryna Mysenko, Associate
Taras Horbatiuk, Managing Partner
Yurii Bielokon, Senior Partner
Natalia Ivanova, Paralegal
Stay ahead with the latest legal insights and industry trends. Subscribe to newsletter
Stay ahead with the latest legal insights and industry trends.
Subscribe to newsletter
